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CUSTOM, TRIBAL COURT PRACTICE, AND POPULAR
JUSTICE
Elizabeth E. Joh*
Using custom is essential for the cultural survival of American
Indians as a distinct people and as a governing entity.
- Gloria Valencia-Weber'
Indian policy literature is preoccupied with the quantity of Indian
control, rather than the quality of its exercise.
- Russel Lawrence Barsh2
Tribal courts in the United States have undergone dramatic changes in the
past forty years.' Encouraged both by recent federal Indian policy and by a
burgeoning sovereignty movement, tribal courts in Indian country' are no
longer the conscious instruments of assimilation and external control that they
were in the nineteenth century.' While there is wide agreement that they have
changed, what modem tribal courts do represent, however, is open to debate.
Supporters of tribal court development assert that these emerging justice
systems vindicate Indian sovereignty and self-determination, particularly
through the use of customary laws and practices.6 Traditional practices, so the
*J.D., 2000, New York University School of Law; Ph.D. student, Institute for Law and
Society., New York University. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Professor
Benedict Kingsbury and the support of the Center on Crime, Communities, and Culture.
1. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L REv. 225,
230 (1994).
2. Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge ofIndigenousSey-Determination, 26 UNIV. MICH.
J.L. REroRhi 277, 303 (1993), reprinted in NAnTvE AMnuCAm SoVEREGNTY 161 (John W.
Wunder ed., 1996).
3. See, e.g., Frank Pomnmersheim, Tribal Courts: Providers of Justice and Protectors of
Sovereignty, 79 JUDIcATURE 110, 112 (1995) (noting "trajectory of the rapid development of
tribal courts" over past thirty to forty years); Carey N. Vincnti, The Reemergence of Tribal
Society and Traditional Justice Systems, 79 JuDICATURE 134, 141 (1995).
4. See Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikenstcher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom
in American Indian Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. COMp. L 287, 303 (1998) ("Since 1790, Congress
has used the phrase 'Indian country' to refer to land subject to tribal and federal law, as opposed
to state law.").
5. See, e.g., Joseph A. Myers & Elbridge Coochise, Development of Tribal Courts: Past,
Present, and Future, 79 JUmcATuRE 147 (1995) ("Several important Indian customs and religious
practices, such as the sun dance, medicine men, and distribution of property owned by an Indian
on his death, were outlawed, and violations were punished by [these early courts].").
6. See, e.g., Daniel L. Lowery, Developing a Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence: The
Navajo Experience, 1969-1992, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 379, 381 (1993) ("['B]y bringing their
unwritten customary law, or common law, into the imposed Anglo-American style tribal court
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theory goes, have transformed the alien "white man's courts" into places
where "Indian justice" can be realized.' But normative assertions about tribal
court practice do not illuminate how they actually work.
The isolation of American Indian law as an area of study sui generis
further obfuscates analytical comparisons with other categories of law.' Those
who study the even more marginalized subject of tribal courts9 have rushed
to enumerate the uses of customary law and traditional practices, with little
critical evaluation of whether these developments are practicable or desirable
for the fundamental issue of indigenous self-government.'" This approach
sidesteps of a number of fundamental questions. Is it accurate to contend that
tribal court practices are unique in this way? Is the use of customary legal
practices necessary for American Indians to flourish as a distinct culture?
This article argues that tribal courts cannot be justified primarily through
the use of custom and tradition. "Customary" law presents too problematic a
concept in most instances to constitute a practicable and coherent foundation
for modem tribal courts. Rather, it will be argued that Indian tribal courts
ought to be understood as a subset of a much wider phenomenon: popular
justice. Popular justice, or informal justice, refers to those law reform
movements in the United States, as well as in other countries, that cast
themselves in opposition to formal, Western, and conventional law models.
The justifications for customary practices in Indian tribal courts bear striking
parallels to the motivations for popular justice movements, particularly those
which seek to recapture "community" norms. The popular justice literature
also provides a useful analytic for the tensions which appear in the use of
systems, tribes are resurrecting, institutionalizing, and applying to the cases that come before them
the norms and values that underlie the tribal traditions and customs.").
7. Despite the frequent use of "Native American" by non-Indians, a survey of the literature
written by and for those interested in tribal courts and culture reveals a preference for the term
"Indian." See Cooter & Fikenstcher, supra note 4, at 287 n.2 ("[Tihe people whom we
interviewed referred to themselves as 'Indians' in almost every case, and only occasionally used
the phrase 'Native Americans.'").
8. Federal Indian law - concerning jurisdictional disputes, the treatment of Indian tribes
in federal courts, etc. - is treated by its own scholars as an esoteric, complicated, and unique
area of study. See infra note 18.
9. Indeed, while there is an enormous body of literature on federal Indian law, there exist
very few studies on the operation of tribal courts. One recent study suggests that not only is there
less scholarship on tribal courts than on federal Indian law, but that it has even diminished over
the years. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 4, at 292 ("For whatever reason, scholars have
neglected the study of tribal courts."). Moreover, any systematic study of the jurisprudence of
tribal courts is complicated by the fact that the majority of decisions are unavailable. There are
only a few Indian law reporters, and the decisions they publish constitution a fraction of those
cases actually decided. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life
of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 285, 294-95 (1998).
10. Fredric Brandfon, Tradition and Judicial Review in the American Indian Tribal Court
System, 28 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1009 (1991) ("Only the use of tribal customs as the bases of




custom in tribal court practice. Ultimately, the discussion of tribal courts as
a mode of popular justice is not so much an indictment as it is a suggestion
that Indian governments reassess the aims of their tribal justice systems.
The Problem of Customary Justice
The ability of Indian tribal courts to use custom rests on their reconstitution
as institutions run by, and for, Indian governments. In 1883, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) established the Courts of Indian Offenses, the first
formal Western-style courts on Indian land." Indian involvement in these
CFR courts (a reference to the Code of Federal Regulations used), was
nominal or nonexistent. 2 Although many traditional practices, including
indigenous methods of adjudication, were suppressed or extinguished by
external regulatory practices like the CFR courts, the assimilation goals of the
federal government were nonetheless considered a failure by the 1930s. 3
Consequently, the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 reflected a shift
in federal policy to encourage the development of tribal self-government.'4
Under the IRA, tribes could establish their own court systems, draft their own
constitutions, and enact their own legislation." CFR courts also continued
to exist, although in a modified form aimed at encouraging tribal
government' In the past thirty years, Indian tribes have increasingly focused
their attentions on the development of tribal government, including tribal
courts. A recent BIA report noted that there are now 254 tribal courts of both
types, with CFR courts in the definite minority." Although their
jurisdictional powers have been severely curtailed, particularly with regard to
criminal cases,' tribal courts are now the primary forum for adjudication in
Indian country on nearly 260 federal reservations. 9
11. See Myers & Coochise, supra note 5, at 147.
12. See id,
13. See i, at 148.
14. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 1, at 235.
15. See id. at 236.
16. Id
17. See Myers & Coochise, supra note 5, at 149. There is some disagreement about the
exact number. See Maria Odum, The Legal System: Money Shortage Seen as Hindering Indian
Justice, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Nov. 28, 1991, at G3 (noting that there are 147 tribal
courts exercising jurisdiction over two million Indians).
18. Again, this article does not address the significant body of federal Indian scholarship,
much of which attempts to disentangle the complex problems of jurisdiction in Indian disputes.
See, e.g., William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH.
L. REv. 1 (1987); Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE
113 (1995); Judith Resnik, Multiple Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Government, 79 JUDICATURE 118 (1995); Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in Indian Courts, 10
UNIV. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 231 (1987); J. Clifford Wallace, A New Era of Federal-Tribal
Court Cooperation, 79 JUDICATURE 150 (1995).
19. See Charles Aweeka, Tribal Courts: Unique System - Circuit Judges Dispense Justice
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Tribal courts are authorized to use custom as a source of law when
applicable.2 Not only is custom an approved source of law, but for many
commentators the use of custom is an essential element of self-
determination.21 Put another way, greater reliance on customary law
represents, both instrumentally and expressively, a "return" to indigenous
sovereignty. However, this emphasis on customary law assumes two
propositions: that customs can be ascertained, and that these customs can be
applied in a satisfactory manner.
Invariably, the search for an applicable customary legal principle raises
questions of authenticity, legitimacy, and essentialism. Where does one find
custom? Many tribal courts have established procedures for proving the
existence of a custom, by reference to an elder's adviceH or to sociological
studies.' The less onerous method of judicial notice may also be
sufficient.' All three methods are vulnerable to competing claims of
legitimacy. Not everyone may agree with a particular elder's interpretation of
an asserted custom.' Many prominent sociological or anthropological studies
of Indian culture have been conducted by non-Indian outsiders, whose
assessment of Indian customs may be colored by prejudice or mistake.' The
use of judicial notice may imply that Indian tribal judges, by virtue of being
Indian (and not all of them are), are able to discern and legitimate customary
laws. Advocates of traditional law compound the problem by evaluating the
successful use of custom with the fundamental fairness and "natural wisdom"
that is Based on a Different Set of Rules, SEATrLE TIMES, July 17, 1997, at Fl. Note that this
article does not discuss a possible third category: traditional courts that were never controlled or
extinguished by the federal government. An example of these courts include the religious courts
of the Pueblos. However, these courts have no recognition outside of their community and cannot
be evaluated in the same manner as tribal courts. In addition, because of secrecy rules, virtually
nothing is known about them. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN
INDIANS, AMERCAN JUSTICE 113 (1983).
20. Usually a tribal code contains a choice of law provision providing the hierarchy of
applicable law. See Newton, supra note 9, at 299.
21. See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, supra note 1.
22. See, e.g., id. at 248. A recent study of tribal courts found that "the most traditional
members [of a tribe], including the elders who are most immersed in the old way of life, often
seem to avoid connection with tribal government and do not participate in court deliberations."
Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 4, at 322.
23. See, e.g., Lowery, supra note 6, at 390-91.
24. In the courts of the Navajo Nation, judicial notice is the predominant method. See
Lowery, supra note 6, at 393, 395-96.
25. See, e.g., Lowery, supra note 6, at 391 (referring to Navajo Nation decision in which
court acknowledged that parties might dispute existence and application of any particular custom).
26. Cf. Laura Nader, When Is Popular Justice Popular, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR
JusTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNrIY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 435, 443 (Sally
Engle Merry & Neal Milner, eds., 1993) (arguing that cultural values underlying dispiute processes
are profoundly political and that several anthropological studies in the 1950s and 1960s




of tribal judgesY Some normative claims about how judges "find" custom
appear no different than descriptions of how any judge, Indian or otherwise,
draws upon his own cultural values. Is the influence of culture on personal
decision making so remarkable? Alternatively, is there something to the status
of being Indian which confers a knowledge of custom? Such claims of
inherent knowledge sound suspiciously essentialist.
When a tribal judge does claim to find applicable custom, is it enough
as some opinions suggest - that the custom is generally "Indian"? In a
typical case, In re C.D.C. and C.M.H., the tribal judge for the Delaware Tribe
of Western Oklahoma based a child custody decision on the following custom:
"[I]t is common knowledge in Indian country that both the maternal and
paternal grandmothers traditionally play a very significant role in the Indian
family."' This invocation of custom suggests that "Indian" here is meant to
be a contrast to non-Indian, or Western values: a rather indeterminate
category.' Surely the many Indian tribes of North America, originally
distributed over a vast geographic range, differ to some extent in their cultural
practices. Yet the use of "custom" at this general level can be found in many
instances2 ° "Indian" traditions in these decisions represent a number of broad
values - community, family, reconciliation, healing, and harmony3 -
which suggest as much a nostalgia for "small-town" norms as they do for
Indian ones.
27. For instance, Cooter & Fikentscher describe the ability ofjudges to divine custom in the
following manner "Some tribal judges and almost all jurors have no formal training in law.
People without legal education who must make legal decisions inevitably draw upon their own
sense of justice, which in turn draws upon custom and tradition." Cooter & Fikentscher, supra
note 4, at 322. See also Valencia-Weber, supra note I, at 262 (advocating custom and asserting
that "[u]ltimately, the legitimacy of the tribal courts rests on decisions that show concern for
justice"). But see SAmuEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF
SEPARATE JUSTICE 27 (1978) ("The sometimes-expressed idea that dispensing justice in this
setting requires only a dose of 'natural wisdom' is not tenable.").
28. No. PG-87-A50, I Okla. Trib. 200, 205 (Oct. 13, 1988). The court also relied on a
number of other sources to reach its decision, including state law and family law scholarship.
29. One might argue that federal Indian law has treated American Indians in this wholesale
manner, but tribal courts themselves are under no obligation to define their constituents so
broadly.
30. See, e.g., Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79
JUDICATURE 126, 126 (1995) ("The indigenous justice paradigm is based on a holistic philosophy
and the world view of the aboriginal inhabitants of North America."); James W. Zion & Robert
Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of Conquest, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 55, 75 (1997) ("The European mind has a difficult time understanding Indian legal
procedure because the legal institutions of Europe, and those imported to the Americas, are a
product of concentrations of royal power, nationalism and central government.... Traditional
Indian legal systems were, in large part... founded on equality and reciprocal relationships.").
31. See, e.g., Robert Yazzie & James W. Zion, 'Slay the Monsters': Peacemaker Court and
Violence Control Plans for the Navajo Nation, in POPULAR JUsTICE AND COMMUNITY
REGENERATION: PATHWAYS OF INDIGENOUS REFORM 67, 77-81 (Kayleen M. Hazelhurst ed.,
1995) (listing "Indian" values); Melton, supra note 30, at 131-32 (same).
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, the applicability of customary law in contemporary Indian life
is far from obvious. In many kinds of law, such as complex commercial
litigation, no one suggests that custom ought to play a dominant role. On the
other hand, in areas of law in which custom is most frequently invoked, such
as family law and hunting rights,' the use of custom presents a number of
difficulties. Members of Indian tribes are not uniformly allied in a "re-
traditionalization movement"33; some find the use of custom outdated or
undesirable.' The influence of modernization and Western culture on
American Indians has resulted in reorganization of the very order, consensus,
and internal social controls on which the customary law model relies. For
instance, while "positive" influences like the American feminist movement
may have mobilized Indian women around causes like domestic violence, such
influences may rattle traditional views on gender relations in customary
law.' No less disruptive is the influence of modem Western social
pathologies - e.g., gang violence and substance abusep - for which custom
may provide a meager anodyne?' The legitimacy of tribal courts depends in
large part on the extent to which Indians can identify with the values the
courts promote?9
32. See, e.g., Lowery, supra note 6, at 402 (noting that Navajo custom is most frequently
applied in family law decisions).
33. See Newton, supra note 9, at 303.
34. In his frequently cited study, Brakel noted that one tribal official's "general opinion was
that the tribal court was 'pathetic' and in need of a 'complete overhaul,' to which he added: 'What
we need is nothing 'racial' - we need just plain white man's justice with no consideration of
extenuating circumstances.'" BRAKEL, supra note 27, at 66. As one might guess, recorded
opinions like this are rare. Reference to a comparable situation is helpful here. A study of Maori
customary practices used in New Zealand juvenile justice law yielded mixed reactions from Maori
participants. While some welcomed the sensitivity to custom, others strongly objected to its use.
Teresa Olsen et al., Maori and Youth Justice in New Zealand, in POPULAR JUSTICE AND
COMMUNrrY EGENERATION: PATHWAYS OF INDIGENOUS REFORM 45, 55-60 (Kayleen M.
Hazlehurst ed., 1995).
35. In some cases, the invocation of traditional "consensus" may sometimes be used to
justify what is in reality a one-party political machine in tribal government. See Barsh, supra note
2, at 169 ("In fact, what has emerged [in tribal government] is the one-party state, which
condemns dissent as foreign-inspired subversion and limits politics to personality disputes among
a clique of strongmen.").
36. See, e.g., Mary-Ellen Turpel, The Women of Many Nations in Canada, in INDIGENOUS
WOMEN ON THE MovE 93-103 (1990).
37. See, e.g., Joint Hearing of the Senate Judiciary & Indian Affairs Committees; Subject:
Indians and Gangs, Federal News Service, Sept. 17, 1997 ("A recent FBI study identified 177
gangs on 14 different reservations."); Lisa M. Poupart, Juvenile Justice Processing of American
Indian Youths, in MINORITIES IN JUVENmE JUSTICE 179 (Kimberly Kempf Leonard et al. eds.,
1995) (suggesting that Indian juveniles are treated more harshly in juvenile justice system).
38. Although the primary legal proceedings for these problems will be criminal, and thus
probably subject to federal jurisdiction, their secondary effects are felt in truancy cases, domestic
violence complaints, and the like: all of which are subject to customary law application in tribal
courts.




No less problematic is the structure of Indian court practice, which is often
defended on the grounds that it is more amenable to, or resembles, traditional
procedures. Most Indian judges are not law school graduates, nor do they
receive any systematic legal training.+' Many tribal courts do not have
prosecutors."1 Although Indian defendants are given a qualified right to an
attorney in criminal cases, most cannot afford them.!2 The majority of
disputants represent themselves, or are represented by a lay advocate, a fellow
reservation member who may only have a high school education 3 While at
first glance these appear to be institutional shortcomings, a number of tribal
court supporters insist that this situation enhances a customary approach to
justice. For instance, Deloria and Lytle contend that
if attorneys were to take over the systems of tribal justice, it
would not be too long before Indian customs and traditions, the
studied informality of the tribal courts, and the particular attention
that tribal judges pay to family situations and responsibilities
would be replaced by a variety of model codes written by and for
the convenience of the attorneys."
In this view, custom is invoked to justify the relaxation, or virtual elimination,
of Anglo-American procedural rules in many tribal justice systems.4'
Advocates of the current system point to instances where tribal judges take the
disputing parties aside, away from the courtroom, and suggest informal
resolutions to disputes." Thus, the tribal court judge is recast in the role of
tribal mediator, the traditional elder whose aim is to restore harmony to the
group.
and the Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18 N. M. L. REV. 49,
60 (1988).
40. See BRAKE!, supra note 27, at 17.
41. See id. at 19.
42. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 19, at 130.
43. See BRAKEL, supra note 27, at 66 ("Mhe advocate admits being frustrated by his lack
of legal ability. Though not stating it explicitly, he implies that the only role he can play is an
obstructionist one - making life difficult for the judges."). One Indian law commentator notes
that although some tribes may require knowledge of customary law as a prerequisite to practice,
it is rarely tested. See Pommersheim, supra note 39, at 57, 58, 59.
44. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 19, at 122.
45. See Aweeka, supra note 19, at Fl ("Evidentiary objections are seldom made, and the
rules of evidence are enforced less strictly than in other courts. In fact, most of the tribal codes
allow any type of evidence, including hearsay.").
46. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 19, at 150 ("The general temperament of tribal judges
is that of the benign patriarch who sincerely wishes to resolve dispute with a minimum of
disruption of human lives .... [Tribal judges] are likely to stpp the proceedings when they notice
a tribal elder in the courtroom and ask his or her opinion on a matter of Indian tradition, which
involves a lengthy conversation .... This behavior is considered normal among Indian people,
for the whole purpose of the trial is to do justice.").
No. 1]
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The invocation of custom here, however, masks causal explanations for the
differences in structure between a tribal court and a state or federal court. A
variety of factors contribute to the absence of practicing attorneys in tribal
courts: the lack of access to professional schools for Indians
1; the reluctance
of the few Indian lawyers to practice in tribal courts; and the dismally
underfunded tribal courts4 themselves, in a profession where prestige is often
tied to salary.4 In theory the withdrawal from formal procedures and
principles may not affect proceedings that focus on "talking out" the
resolution of disputes. On the surface of things, it may appear that a tribal
court proceeding vindicates customary practices; the judge may know the
parties or be related to them, many "legalistic" practices are tossed aside, and
all parties are relatively free to speak their minds.
° Studies of tribal court
practice, however, suggest that in a large number of cases, individuals in tribal
courts receive neither a Western-style adjudication nor a customary one."
Criminal defendants may be convicted or pressured into pleading guilty on the
basis of virtually no evidence: a phenomenon Brakel deplores as "summary
justice."' And, unlike the use of customary law, tribal court practices are not
a choice among alternatives in individual cases. The absence of formality and
"legalese" is not necessarily identical to the practice of customary law.
The difficulties of using customary law in tribal court practice also apply
to experiments in recreating traditional dispute mechanisms, of which the
Navajo Peacemaker Court is the primary example. Established in 1982, the
Peacemaker Court offers to voluntary participants the opportunity to have their
claims resolved through what are purportedly "traditional" Navajo
procedures.' No judge presides, and the designated mediator is present
47. In 1982 there were approximately 450 lawyers in the U.S. who identified themselves as
Indian. See DEMORIA & LYTL, supra note 19, at 149.
48. See, e.g., Myers & Coochise, supra note 5, at 149 ('Given the current $12 million in
federal funding, the average is less than $48,000 per court system, per year to fund judges, clerks,
prosecutors, defenders, the juvenile and probation departments, bailiffs and process servers, court
facilities, court resources, and administrative costs.... There are no state or federal court systems
that function on only $200,000, let alone less than $48,000 per year.").
49. See Vincenti, supra note 3, at 139 ("[Tihe tribal courts are last in line to be considered
for career development. Tribal courts have had to bear a reputation for providing little in the way
of salary .... ").
50. See BRAKE!, supra note 27, at 94.
51. See id. at 99 ("In the tribal courts, the judges rarely attempted to effect reconciliations
between disputants or to establish harmony among reservation factions. In general, they made
summary dispositions of the cases before reaching the merits. Often, as a result, the parties were
left confused and unhappy."). Note that Brakel's study is exceptional in its skeptical evaluation
of tribal court practice. Probably as a result of studies like his, many tribes are now quite
reluctant to grant access to researchers. See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 4, at 292 n.16
("[S]ome reservations now require researchers to apply to a tribal board for permission to enter
the reservation and conduct research. These boards, which have little to lose from denying an
application, proceed cautiously and slowly.").
52. BRAKEL, supra note 27, at 44.




primarily to assemble the parties and to coordinate activities with the district
tribal court.' The results of a Peacemaker Court are to be as binding as a
tribal court judgment. Many of the same difficulties regarding custom in tribal
courts are present in the creation, justification, and use of the Peacemaker
Court. First, the "custom" cited as a precedent for this forum was found to
have existed "from the times of the Navajo Court of Indian Offenses, 1892
to 1959."' The use of custom here suggests not a practice extending far
beyond European contact, but a method of resistance against external
domination. Is this custom, or culture, or both? Second, among the sources
used for the creation of the Peacemaker Court were not only Navajo practices,
but Quaker mediation, practices of the American Arbitration Association, and
the procedures of American small claims courts.& ' Despite these very
different sources, the Peacemaker Court is typically cited for its "traditional"
roots.' Finally, recent scholarship suggests that the Peacemaker Court has
more symbolic than practical value as an adjudicatory forum. The available
data indicate a significant lack of use by the Navajo community.'
These several complications suggest an alternative interpretation to the
justification for "custom" in tribal courts. Given the ambiguity of its
definition, the values it attempts to vindicate, the uncertainty of its application,
and the timing of its popularity, "custom" in tribal court practice appears to
be not so much a literal recapture of historically accurate practices but rather
a mode of resistance to all that Western legal culture represents. Defined in
this way, the support of custom in tribal court practices shares many attributes
of other legal movements which seek their vindication in opposition to
conventional formal law.
Tribal Courts and Popular Justice
Although Indian law generally has been treated as a unique area of study,
the support for customary law in tribal courts is best understood as a type of
popular justice movement. In the United States, the most recent outburst of
support for popular justice took place in the 1960s and 1970s." The
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement was spearheaded by then
Accommodation to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 89, 89-90 (1983).
54. See id. at 103.
55. See id. at 94.
56. See id. at 96.
57. See, e.g., Lowery, supra note 6, at 383 ("The most far-reaching exercise of custom and
tradition by the Navajo courts took place... when the judges of the courts formally adopted the
rules establishing the Navajo Peacemaker Court.").
58. See Lowery, supra note 6, at 385 n.23.
59. However, popularjustice movements have also been prominent in earlier periods in the
U.S. See, e.g.. Christie B. Harrington, Delegalization Reform Movements: A Historical Analysis,
in 1 THE POLrncs OF INFO uRMAL Jus'nmc 35 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982).
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Chief Justice of the United Stated Supreme Court, Earl Warren.' Chief
Justice Warren delivered a number of speeches in which he advocated an
alternative to courts that focused less on adversarial tactics, and more on
harmony, personal relationships, community, and healing." These values lie
at the heart of most popular justice movements, whether they take the form
of mediation processes, neighborhood justice centers, or family group
conferences. Popular justice depends on these idealized values. Most
important to the constitution of popular justice is its dependence on a series
of binary oppositions in which informal, local, family/community-oriented,
healing, and expressive values are defined against "law,"' which represents
formalism, professionalism (i.e., lawyers), the adversarial process,
bureaucracy, and the state.' These oppositions are virtually identical to those
found in justifications for customary Indian law. For instance, in comparing
an "American Justice Paradigm" with an "Indigenous Justice Paradigm,"
Melton offers a series of contrasting attributes, including "[a]dversarial and
conflict oriented" versus "[b]uilds trusting relationships to promote resolution
and healing"; and a "[f]ocus on individual rights" versus a "[f]ocus on victims
and community, apology and forgiveness.""
Two aspects of the movement's ideology are particularly helpful in
understanding the place of customary Indian law in popular justice. First,
popular justice typically depends on a constructed myth of community.65 The
attempt to recapture the lost values of community affect the organization of
popular justice reforms in specific ways. The reconstitution of community
requires that legal processes are local. All participants originate from the
community, and as many as possible are given a "voice" in the proceedings.
Third parties and staff are typically lay people, with the same dress,
demeanor, and skills (i.e., unskilled) as the participants. The language of the
proceedings is plain and nontechnical; reasoning is commonsense-oriented.
The aim of any resolution is to restore harmony to the community, rather than
to determine a winner between two disputing parties. Thus, criminal sanctions
tend to focus on restitution, or on public displays of remorse, rather than on
punishment. These values are the same ones touted by supporters of
60. See Laura Nader, supra note 26, at 435, 441.
61. Id.
62. Id. (describing Warren's efforts as part of an "antilaw" movement).
63. See Peter Fizpatrick, The Impossibility of Popular Justice, I Soc. & LEGAL STUDIES 199,
200 (1992) ("Popular justice takes identity through the not uncommon mythic mode in which
binary oppositions provoke and produce positive contents. The great figure of opposition and
rejection is the state.").
64. Melton, supra note 30, at 133.
65. See Richard L. Abel, The Contradiction of Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 59, at 267, 276. The description of the popular justice model in
the following paragraphs taken from Abel and from Sally Engle Merry, Popular Justice and the




customary law, and the attributes of a community-oriented process are
strikingly similar to tribal court practice.' The idea of "community" is
especially appealing in Indian country where the population is more
homogeneous than in other parts of the United States and appears to be a
cohesive group.
Second, popular justice provides a therapeutic model of resolution. This
explains why popular justice forums generally relax or eliminate procedures
that limit the parties' ability to speak. Having had one's "say" is typically a
measure of a proceeding's success. Another measure is the degree to which
the injured party, and community participants or observers, feel "healed" by
the process: friendships mended, family ties restored, or a sense of community
security regained. Healing also tends to be a primary focus in tribal court
proceedings. One recurring theme in Indian law scholarship is the extent to
which tribal courts vindicate the feelings of the victim, both by giving voice
to the victim's injury, and by ordering forms of restitution by the offender. 7
These gestures are opposed to the cold, formal, and individualistic
punishments of the state.'
This comparison suggests that customary law in tribal court practice shares
too much in common with other popular justice movements for it to be a
unique phenomenon. More than the accumulation of historically accurate
practices, the term "custom" in tribal courts represents a mode of struggle
against external control. To say that custom in tribal courts is best understood
as a kind of popular justice movement is not to suggest that it is wholly
artificial, or that it contains nothing that is recognizably indigenous to Indian
culture. There is almost certainly influence from both sides. Tribal courts
began to flourish at roughly the same time that many of the American popular
justice movements, such as the San Francisco Community Boards, came into
existence.' It is possible that supporters of traditional Indian legal practices
were bolstered by similar movements which stressed community, local
control, and harmony. In addition, the pop psychology terms of the 1970s
"therapy" decade70 probably had some impact on all legal reform movements
66. See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, supra note 1, at 262 ("A world view focused upon collective
values, where nature is part of the community, presents different principles upon which to decide
the recurring disputes among members. More than individual victims are considered when the
restoration of harmony and balance is the objective.").
67. See, e.g., Melton, supra note 30, at 132 ("Offenders [in Indian custom] are forced to be
accountable for their behavior, to face the people whom they have hurt, to explain themselves,
to ask forgiveness, and to take full responsibility for making amends. Observing and hearing the
apology enables the victim and family to discern its sincerity and move toward forgiveness and
healing.").
68. Of course the opposition depends on painting the state in these very broad and
oversimplified terms. This necessarily omits the complicated internal reforms within Western law,
e.g., the victims' rights movement, alternative to incarceration, etc.
69. See Nader, supra note 26, at 438.
70. Id.
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which aspired to be more emotionally oriented. The development of some
alternatives, like the Navajo Peacemaker Court, acknowledged these external
resources.!' By the same token, popular justice movements of the same
period often relied upon idealized images of pre-colonial, pre-capitalist, and
non-Western societies to point to everything that was wrong with conventional
modern law.'
Tensions Within Popular Justice
If support for custom in tribal courts is a type of popular justice movement,
it is also vulnerable to many of the criticisms of popular justice. Legal reform
movements typically draw upon imagery that provides a shorthand for their
values, justifications, and operations. Popular justice generally, and Indian
customary law in particular, depend upon oppositions in which they offer
harmony, community, healing, and informality as alternatives to the
formalism, bureaucracy, and technicality of state law. However, in practice
popular justice often promises what it cannot deliver.
A recurring criticism relevant to tribal courts is that popular justice results
in a corruption of informalism in which catharsis becomes the end of the
process, rather than the means. 3 Often, participants in a popular justice
setting view the process as expressive, rather than instrumental.
7' As a result,
the emphasis on feelings to the virtual exclusion of other aims tends to
suppress or neutralize conflicts rather than resolve them." Structural
deficiencies enhance the silencing of conflicts. Hampered by the lack of any
professional training, staff members of informal institutions actively encourage
compromise.' By insisting on compromise, popular justice institutions deny
the existence of frequent, antagonistic conflict, by "simulating a society in
which conflict is less frequent and less threatening."" The support of custom
in tribal courts is often predicated on the assertion that Indian culture is more
harmonious, and consensus-oriented than non-Indian society. Yet the inherent
contradiction in the use of compromise is that it typically works by
71. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
72. See Nader, supra note 26, at 444 (noting that studies of non-Western law in the 1950s
and 1960s erroneously described most indigenous systems of law as centered on compromise);
Fitzpatrick, supra note 63, at 209 ("A voracious ethnography provided accounts of 'different'
cultures' in which 'the apparent naturalness ... of informal dispute processing! provided ideate
origins for alternative justice in the United States.").
73. See Abel, supra note 65, at 294; Fitzpatrick, supra note 63, at 203 ("Feelings are
elevated over facts and aspirations, even over a resolution of the dispute. The primacy of feelings
disconnects the disputants from the social forces encapsulated in their conflict. At best, what is
relevant is how they feel about such things").
74. See Abel, supra note 65, at 284.
75. See id. at 280.
76. See id. at 293.




individualizing grievances.7' Despite its insistence on healing and on a
broader community dynamic, the nature of compromise obstructs the redress
of systematic social problems." Although informal institutions, like the
Peacemaker Court, may speak of the Indian community, what they actually
address and encourage is a "collection of isolated individuals circumscribed
by residence."' Other institutional deficits aggravate the problem. Tribal
courts, like many informal institutions, usually lack the records that would
suggest patterns in juvenile delinquency, domestic violence, or land
disputes." Like many who work in informal institutions, tribal court staff,
who experience a high turnover rate and little professional training, may have
little or no ability to aggregate problems brought before the court.'
A second objection to popular justice is that informal institutions tend to
expand state control rather than represent the "rolling back" of the state. A
reality of informal institutions is that they never exist entirely outside of the
state. Because the state maintains the only recognized source of legitimate
authority, reformist institutions must "either be its creation or exist at its
sufferance."" The extent of state direction or sanction of informal institutions
is usually concealed by the language and forms of popular justice." By
convincing local populations that their processes are more natural, indigenous,
and friendly, informal institutions tend to mask the coercion which stimulates
resistance and justifies demands for substantive rights." For most Indians,
tribal courts are not an alternative, but the only forum for adjudication of their
claims. Indian disputants are urged to support tribal courts because they
vindicate "their" values. However, the use and acceptance of more informal
institutions like tribal courts discourage other "nonstate sanctions," such as
"gossip, boycott, [and] self-help."'
78. See id. at 289.
79. See Robert C. Depew, Popular Justice and Aboriginal Communities, 36 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM 21, 54 (1996) ("[fihe ideology and language of 'healing' have a tendency to mask
the diversity of individual, group and community justice problems by considering them as similar
'illnesses', and to homogenize, and therefore trivialize, the corresponding need by applying a
therapeutic response that is supposed to lead to 'health.'").
80. Id at 289.
81. See Cooter & Flketscher, supra note 4, at 327 ("When we asked tribal judges for files
from previous cases, many judges did not have any to show us. Most tribal judges cannot consult
records of rules and principles articulated in past decisions in their own courts.").
82. See Abel, supra note 65, at 289.
83. See id. at 275.
84. But see Merry, supra note 65, at 166 ("Even tribunals ideologically opposed to state law
and founded on a critique of its failures, nevertheless borrow its forms and symbols: the table,
the book of rules and the judge.").
85. See Abel, supra note 65, at 270; Merry, supra note 65, at 168 ("By its appeal to
indigenous ordering, [popular justice] defuses protest and resistance to state law.").
86. Abel. supra note 65, at 277.
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The result of being implicated in the state system is that informal
institutions invariably end up at the bottom of the hierarchyY This situation,
which Abel terms "internal colonialism,"' produces a number of disabling
consequences. The self-help ethos of using local, indigenous, or customary
practices veils a lack of state interest, and perhaps more importantly, state
funding. The rhetoric of giving communities control over their own problems
often comes at the cost of state finances. Tribal courts have not been immune
from this problem. Though federal officials have been lavish in their praise
of Indian sovereigntys, self-government has also come hand in hand with
decreasing levels of federal funds.93 In addition, support for popular justice
movements often implicates negative normative assessments by legal elites;
judges from state and federal systems are happy to shed what they see as
"junk" cases - cases they view as politically, economically, and socially
insignificant.' Part of this devaluation is tied to the demographics of the
participants. Tribal courts, like many neighborhood justice centers and
community boards, serve politically disempowered groups.'
None of these criticisms, however, are meant to be fatal. Even the most
skeptical assessments acknowledge that popular justice movements aspire to
worthy and commendable goals: a preference for harmony, quick and cheap
methods for dispute resolution, participatory decision making rather than rigid
professionalism, and processes that are familiar rather than arcane.93 Despite
the influence and infiltration of the state, popular justice nevertheless provides
a contested space in which forms of resistance or alternatives to state law are
nurtured.'
Conclusions
This article has argued that the use of custom in Indian tribal courts
represents a type of a popular justice movement, rather than another example
87. See Merry, supra note 65, at 163 ("Popular justice typically functions at the bottom tier
of state law.").
88. See Abel, supra note 65, at 301.
89. See, e.g., Reno, supra note 18, at 113 ("Mribal justice systems are essential pieces of
the mosaic of tribal self-governance.").
90. See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 2, at 161 (noting that federal aid to Indian tribes began
decreasing significantly in the 1970s); Myers & Coochise, supra note 5, at 148 (noting that
although Congress passed a much needed Indian Tribal Justice Act in 1993, promising over $58
million in funding, zero funds had been appropriated as of 1996).
91. See Abel, supra note 65, at 302.
92. A significant exception to this is the explosive growth of gaming law, but its practice
in tribal courts has been much like any other federal or state court. See Dick Dahl, The Gamble
That Paid Off, A.B.A. J., May 1995, at 86, 86 (noting that gaming law has "reoriented the
practice of 'Indian law' from poverty law to business law").
93. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 65, at 310.




of Indian law exceptionalism. This alternative interpretation suggests some
general conclusions for thinking about the development of tribal courts
generally and their scholarly assessment.
First, tribal leaders and judges should reassess the extent to which custom
is necessary to indigenous self-government. Many Indian leaders fear that
Indian self-government is predicated on cultural difference, and therefore on
traditional practices." However, given the problematic use of custom in
tribal court practice, tribal governments would benefit from asserting the right
to self-government in terms of local control, and community participation.
Tribal governments can pursue the ownership of their justice problemse
without relying on cultural otherness. Disengaging tradition from self-
government could produce significant changes in tribal court priorities. Tribal
courts can continue to encourage community participation, but not at the
expense of individual substantive rights. It is possible to require higher
standards of professional training for all tribal court staff without drawing
criticism that this reflects nontraditional influences. Alternatively, tribal courts
can pursue funds for professional training more aggressively, rather than
suggest that the employment of lay person staff comports with custom. The
institutional energy invested in the search for customary laws and practices
might be redirected towards addressing systematic problems in Indian country
that would benefit from social work, education, and preventative care.
Second, a more critical evaluation of the role of "custom" affects the
measure of success in tribal courts. When custom is a primary justification,
the question posed is the extent to which a particular practice is "customary
enough." However, if custom is not necessary to indigenous self-government,
different questions may provide a better measure of success.' Do the
participants feel that their concerns have been addressed? Are the
community's interests represented in court? Do all participants in the process
express satisfaction? Does the tribal court address recurring problems in the
95. See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 2, at 162 ("American Indian tribal leaders and their academic
supporters are locked in a conspiracy of denial. They fear that should white Americans discover
that there is nothing qualitatively different, or substantially better, about Indian self-government,
they will abolish it."). But see Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 4, at 321 ("Some Indians told
us that traditional Indians prefer to elect assimilated Indians to tribal office so that they can work
better with whites and provide a buffer against the surrounding society.").
96. See Depew, supra note 79, at 53 ("By acting, the community, rather than the State, can
claim ownership of justice problems and can administer justice independently from the State.").
97. Indeed, in Olsen et al.'s study of culturally sensitive family group conferences in New
Zealand, the authors concluded that the success of the process could be measured in a general
sense of community involvement, rather than any specific satisfaction of Maori needs. See Olsen,
supra note 34, at 61 ("The answer is, in our view, that inevitably the processes and patterns
developed in small clan-based communities cannot be replicated in a modern, industrial, mobile,
and industrialized culture. But on the other hand, . .. it is possible for the spirit of the
community-based social systems of the past to adapt to modem times and to modify the
individualistic and remote patterns that have characterized Western justice models.").
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community? Of course, even in this alternative model, terms like "local
control' and "satisfaction" must be defined with some specificity in order to
be meaningful. Nevertheless, popular justice provides tribal governments -
and indigenous people generally - with an alternative vision in which group
autonomy is not contingent upon a thorny search for "authentic" roots.
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